I Introduction
Since 1991, the Australian telecommunications system has undergone substantial reform. The former publicly owned monopoly Telstra, established through the 1990 merger of Telecom and OTC, has been corporatized and partly privatized.
1 Competition in long-distance, international and mobile markets was fostered through the introduction of a private competitor Optus in 1991, with unrestricted market entry allowed after 1997. Administrative safeguards concerning network access and interconnection for new entrants were intended to reduce the risk of anti-competitive behaviour by the vertically integrated incumbent. To a large extent, the economic correctness of the above policy choices critically depends on whether Australian telecommunications exhibited natural monopoly THE ECONOMIC RECORD, VOL. 77, NO. 239, DECEMBER, 2001, 338^350 338 # 2001. The Economic Society of Australia. ISSN 0013^0249.
characteristics.
2 Quiggin (1998 Quiggin ( , 1999 suggests that recent Australian telecommunications policy fails to adequately account for natural monopoly. He argues that alternative institutional structures, designed to exploit economies of scale and scope, may have provided lower industry costs. In particular, he calls for the restoration of full government ownership of Telstra, which would act as a common carrier system for cable TV and local telephony. 3 This would allow consumer access to all content providers regardless of the carrier supplying their access to the cable network.
Several potential sources of natural monopoly are possible in local telecommunications markets. Traditionally, returns to scale in local services arise from economies in the physical provision of basic services and in managerial economics of size, such as network planning, co-ordination and management. 4 Economies of scale can also arise as local networks are characterized by large network and call externalities that lead to a larger increase in tra¤c volume than in the number of subscribers (Sung and Gort 1997) . Further, there are economies of sole provision due to cost savings accruing to integrated planning of network growth and switching capacity (Heenan 1989) . 5 However, what is a natural monopoly is likely to change with technology and shifts in demand. For instance, while technology change may allow competition in previously monopolistic industries, it may also generate new sources of natural monopoly (Maddock 1999) . Toward this end, it is unclear whether local telephone services currently involve a natural monopoly technology.
As noted by King (1997) , the existence of a natural monopoly technology in Australian telecommunications is ultimately an empirical question. The cost structure of the telecommunications system can be estimated to infer the natural monopoly status of the industry. Unfortunately, the received econometric evidence of the presence of natural monopoly in telecommunications is largely unhelpful (Table 1) . For instance, Evans and Heckman (1984, 1986) reject the hypothesis that the United States (US) Bell system was a natural monopoly during the predivestiture period, while RÎller (1990a RÎller ( , 1990b , Diewert and Wales (1991a, 1991b) , Pulley and Braunstein (1992) and Braunstein and Pulley (1998) ¢nd the system a natural monopoly. Braunstein and Pulley conclude that ¢ndings concerning the natural monopoly hypothesis for the Bell System are`fragile'. In particular, they suggest that careful attention be given to the functional form of the cost function, and the properness of the estimated cost surface in both the estimating and forecast output regions. 6 Further, all of the above studies are based on the Christensen et al. (1983) data set that contains 31 annual time-series observations for the Bell system. Evans and Heckman (1988) conclude that ¢nding better data, and not alternative estimation metrics, would be a more fruitful line of inquiry. The need to analyse Australian telecommunications systems cost data is even more necessary given the distinctly di¡erent institutional arrangements that has governed Australian and US industry evolution.
This paper provides the ¢rst publicly available estimates of the Australian telecommunications system cost structure. Estimation is on a unique data set constructed from Australia Post, Postmaster-General's (PMG) Department and Telecom Australia annual reports from 1926 to 1991. Tests of the system's cost structure for the presence of natural monopoly characteristics are 2 The Hilmer committee recognized that when a ¢nal good or service is most e¤ciently produced by a natural monopoly technology then their competitive supply is socially wasteful (King 1997 ). An industry is a natural monopoly when its cost function Cq i is subadditive. That is, CS i q i S i Cq i for all output vectors q i (Baumol 1977; Baumol and Braunstein 1977) .
3 Common carriers o¡er telecommunications services to the public at large. Traditionally, common carriers have accepted universal service obligations for a high level of regulation that prevents them from facing open competition. 4 Returns to scale in switching and transmission of signals enables service to be best provided within a local area through one or more switches, giving rise to a minimum e¤cient network size. The primary asset in a local network is the number of access lines, which are supported by switches and employees. A larger network may be able to handle randomly varying demand more e¤ciently by reallocations of capacity among switching and transmission equipment (Greenwald and Sharkey 1989) . 5 Potential economies of scope can arise from service to multiple local markets, joint provision of local and long-distance services, and joint provision of telephone, data and pay-TV services (Quiggin 1998) . 6 A proper cost function is non-negative and linear homogeneous, concave in input prices, and has positive marginal cost schedules. also undertaken. A test for natural monopoly for Australian telecommunications may seem unnecessary at this point, with the sector open to competition. Nevertheless, the presence of economies of scope may prove important for issues facing an emerging information economy. For instance, whether the recent spate of mergers to form global communications companies, and so allow the delivery of service bundles, is in the Australian public interest. Evidence presented here might provide some indication as to the extent of cost e¤ciencies achieved from convergence of broadcasting and telecommunications operators. The presence of natural monopoly characteristics also presupposes that market co-ordination between separate ¢rms (by networking or interconnection) is less able to achieve the same economies as internal co- (1983, 1984, 1986, 1988) Bell system ordination within a ¢rm. With increasing unbundling and interconnection of telecommunications services, it is not clear that this presumption holds (Albon et al. 1997) . The paper is organized as follows. A selective history of the Australian telecommunications system is given in section II, and telecommunications performance from 1950 to 1991 is described in section III. Section IV discusses the merits and appropriateness of applying the translog cost function, and describes the data used for estimation. The introduction of a quadratic spline function to model technological change is described in section V and its integration into the cost function in section VI. An empirically tractable test for local subadditivity is described and implemented in section VII. Concluding remarks and policy implications are provided in section VIII.
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II The Australian Telecommunications System
The Constitution Act 1900 authorized the Commonwealth government to take over and administer the postal and telegraph departments of each State of the newly formed Commonwealth. On 1 March 1901, the separate Colonial departments were amalgamated into the PMG Department of the Commonwealth. The PMG was solely responsible for telecommunications service provision and regulation until the Overseas Telecommunications Act 1946 established OTC to provide international facilities and services. The Telecommunications Act 1975 separated post and telecommunications service provision, and established Telecom as the provider of local and long-distance telephone services. In 1981, AUSSAT was created to develop a national satellite system, while AUSTEL was established as the independent regulator in 1989. The Telecommunications Act 1991 introduced competition into the market place. Telecom and OTC merged into a single general carrier, Telstra, while Optus Communications purchased AUSSAT to create a second general carrier. The Commonwealth government assured Optus that no new general carrier licences would be granted prior to July 1997. The Optus licence required the company to supply long-distance and international services to the entire Australian population by December 1997 (Bureau of Transport and Communications Economics 1995). Post-1997 arrangements require that general carriers interconnect any other carrier or service provider on request, so long as su¤cient capacity is available and the speci¢ed interconnection is technically feasible. On 1 July 1997, regulatory responsibility was passed from AUSTEL to the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission.
III Telecommunications Performance
Australian telecommunications performance is described by various productivity, cost and output measures.
7 Partial productivity measures are presented in Figures 1^3 . The ratio of telephone mainlines to full-time employees (MPE) provides an indication of labour productivity relating to the construction, maintenance and operation of the network. The rapid increase in MPE, 4.6 per 7 Revenue and costs are de£ated by the CPI (1990 100). Another indicator of labour productivity is the ratio of telecommunications service revenue to full-time employees (RPE). RPE has also experienced substantial growth during the post-war period (5.1 per cent p.a.) and re£ects, in part, labour-shedding e¡ects. The ratio of telecommunications service revenue to mainlines (RPL) measures capital productivity. RPL provides a guide to the intensity of network usage and is important to investment planners as it provides an indication of the required payback period. RPL declined from 1950 to 1959, and then experienced steady growth until the mid-1970s. A substantial fall in RPE in the mid-1970s coincides with the break up of the PMG into Australia Post and Telecom.
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IV Cost Function Estimation
Telecommunications technology can be studied empirically using a variety of methods such as cost, distance, labour-requirements, production, pro¢t or transformation function approaches. The cost function approach de¢nes the ¢rm's minimum cost of providing a set of telecommunications services, conditional on given purchase prices of the factors of production and on a particular state of technology. Cost function speci¢cation implies the output level is exogenous. Australian telecommunications services were provided by a public monopoly until 1991. The monopoly was not allowed to choose its own production level to maximize pro¢ts, but required to supply all services demanded at regulated prices, subject to meeting universal service obligations. Since decisions were made with regard to the determination of the optimal levels of inputs, the speci¢cation that input levels are endogenous and output is exogenous is a reasonable assumption.
Australian telecommunications can be described by the multi-product translog cost function. The key advantage of the translog is that it avoids imposing a priori restrictions on substitution elasticities. Further £exibility is incorporated into the cost model by adding a spline function that allows for non-constant exogenous technical change.
8
V Quadratic Spline Function Quadratic spline functions provide an e¤cient method of allowing model parameters to vary across sub-samples of the data while maintaining continuity at the joins. Radical changes in technology over the sample period require a function capable of permitting the e¡ects of technology to change from one era to another. Speci¢cation of a £exible technological progress function is provided by
where t is a time trend, t i are speci¢c ¢xed periods (or knots), the dummy variable d 0 1 when t 0 < t t 1 and zero otherwise, d 1 1 when t 1 < t t 2 and zero otherwise, d 2 1 when t 2 < t t 3 and zero otherwise, and the a i , b i and c i are parameters to be estimated.
To ensure the technology function meets at the knots and is continuous to at least the ¢rst derivative, it is necessary to constrain (1). Following Suits et al. (1978) , the Tech function is speci¢ed as
where the D i are de¢ned as: D 1 1, if t 1 < t and zero otherwise, and D 2 1, if t 2 < t and zero otherwise. Setting t 0 0, (2) becomes
VI Cost Function Restrictions
To ensure a proper cost function is estimated, symmetry and homogeneity restrictions are imposed. Symmetry restrictions imply that g LT g TL and
Imposing these restrictions on the translog cost function with quadratic spline arguments allowing for four intervals results in the estimating equation:
The translog is often criticized for not being robust at close to zero output levels. RÎller (1990b) uses a generalized CES-quadratic cost function that can model cost behaviour in the range of zero outputs. Pulley and Braunstein (1992) propose the composite cost function, which combines the log-quadratic input price structure of the translog with a quadratic structure for multiple outputs. The composite cost function improves on the CES-quadratic form by not imposing separability. Here, the translog is used with greater attention paid to the properness of the estimated cost surface.
where ln is the natural logarithm operator, C is the total cost of producing telephone services, q L is the number of local calls, q T is the number of toll calls, w L (labour price) is total salary expense divided by the number of employees, w K (capital price) is calculated from residual expenses (total cost less labour expenses), divided by mainlines. All data are obtained from CEEM (2001). By Shephard's Lemma x i @c=@w i , where x i is the quantity demanded for the ith factor. The corresponding cost share equation for labour is
Summary statistics for all variables are provided in Table 2 . The translog cost function (4) and labour share equation (5) are estimated by Zellner's (1962) seemingly unrelated regression estimation (SURE) technique using annual data from 1926 to 1991. Model estimation allows for ¢rst-order autocorrelation in each equation. Restricted SURE results for (1) are presented in Table 3 .
Twelve of the 18 estimated coe¤cients are signi¢cant at the 10% level. All ¢rst-order terms, except for toll output, are signi¢cant while the second-order output coe¤cients are of plausible magnitudes. These latter estimates contrast with those of Evans and Heckman (1984) , Bloch et al. (1998) , Charnes et al. (1988) and Sera¢ca (1998) which have absolute values in the range of four to ten. Large second-order output elasticities imply that a per cent increase in output causes an implausibly large change in the output cost elasticity, and suggests inferences regarding economies of scale and scope must be fragile (Braunstein and Pulley 1998) . For labour input price, the cost elasticity or factor share coe¤cient (Labour) is positive and has plausible magnitude. The time placement of knots is a priori di¤cult as the impact of technical progress on costs is not directly observable. Following Diewert and Wales (1992), a grid search determines the location of the three knots (Spline 1, Spline 2 and Spline 3) of the quadratic spline according to the maximum of the likelihood function. To derive estimates consistent with theory, all spline interaction parameters are set to zero. The splines allow for shifts in technology by modifying the time trend. As indicated in Table 3 , Spline 1 corresponds to 1928, Spline 2 to 1968 and Spline 3 to 1978. Spline 1 is located very close to the beginning of the sample data and, by its location, suggests a substantial change in technology between the 1926^28 period relative to the 1928^68 interval. Moreover, Spline 1 and Spline 2 are located close to data points corresponding to shifts in toll output in periods 1931 and 1960. The former point coincides with the Great Depression while the latter accords with the introduction of extended local service areas (PMG 1960). 9 Table 4 presents summary statistics for the estimated translog cost function. Own price elasticity estimates of demand for labour (EPL) and capital (EPK) are inelastic for the entire sample. TECH, the per cent change in cost due to changing technology, is negative when technology is cost saving. TECH is found always positive and large in magnitude, although the estimates decline through time. Elasticity estimates of cost for local (EQ1) and toll (EQ2) output are unit elastic and inelastic, respectively.
10 Returns to scale (RS) show constant returns to scale until the post-war period, and then trend upward, revealing scale economies by the 1980s.
VII Properness and Subadditivity
When cost function estimation is undertaken with a view to testing for natural monopoly, global information about the cost function is required. To overcome data limitations, Evans and Heckman (1983, 1984) propose a local test of natural monopoly that does not require global information on ¢rms' cost functions by restricting the test to the admissible region. The admissible region is the area where no ¢rm produces less of either output than is observed in market data, and the hypothetical ¢rms produce in the range of ratios of outputs actually observed in these data. This restriction avoids making inferences outside the observed output combinations, while the test area is restricted to the region where the estimates are most likely to be well behaved (the centre of the observations). Their test rejects global subadditivity when subadditivity is rejected in a region, while acceptance of local subadditivity does not imply global subadditivity.
Formally, the cost function Cq L ; q T , is subadditive at q L ; q T if and only if
for all 0 f; o 1. For ¢rms A and B, and outputs q L and q T , the degree of subadditivity associated with alternative output allocations f; o are de¢ned as
where C A f; o and C B f; o are the costs to ¢rm A and ¢rm B of producing the output combinations q LA ; q TA and q LB ; q TB , respectively, and C T is the cost of single ¢rm production. The production levels for A and B of the two goods are determined by
where 0 f, o 1, and q LM and q TM are the minimum levels of local and toll output observed in the sample. When Subf; o > 0< 0, the monopoly situation is less (more) e¤cient than the two-¢rm allocation described by that f; o combination. The value of Subf; o represents the per cent gain or loss from two ¢rm production versus single ¢rm production. In calculating the Subf; o in (7), the ¢tted cost function from (4) for each year is used. Total observed output is divided between the hypothetical ¢rms and total cost for each ¢rm is calculated using the estimated cost function (4) with the theoretical outputs rather than the observed total output. As none of Evans and Heckman's hypothetical output combinations satisfy the conditions of a proper cost function, their subadditivity tests are 9 The PMG Annual Report for 1960 reported a 40 per cent diversion of tra¤c from toll to local calls through the extension of local call areas.
10 Negative EQ2 implies negative marginal costs of toll output. This ¢nding is not unique to this study with Diewert and Wales (1991a) reporting negative values of @C=@q 2 for 21 of their 31 observations. 
Substitution of cost function estimates and sample observations into (9) reveals that none of the 66 observations have negative marginal costs with respect to local output. The ¢nal properness condition is that the cost function be concave in input prices. Following Diewert and Wales (1987) , the cost function is concave in input prices since the matrix
is negative de¢nite (where Ã indicates the estimated cost shares). Finally, both local and toll service doubled by 1943, making it the ¢rst possible year for implementation of the subadditivity test. Between 1943 and 1991, the ratio of local to toll output lay between 4.88 and 21.67.
Subf; o is calculated for the combinations of f; o corresponding to f 0; 0:1; 0:2; . . . ; 0:9; 1 and o 0; 0:1; 0:2; . . . ; 0:9; 1 for each year 1943 through 1991. 13 When f is equal to zero, the ¢rm produces only the observed minimum in local call output. When f is equal to one, the ¢rm has 100 per cent market share of the output in excess of twice the observed minimum local call output. Similarly, o has the same interpretation for toll output. Figure 7 plots the maximum Subf; o from 1943 to 1988. An upward trend in Subf; o from negative to positive values suggests the evolution of cost additivity is associated with exogenous technology change. The maximum Subf; o is negative from 1943 to 1945. After 1945, the maximum Subf; o is positive, rejecting local subadditivity of the cost function. Of particular interest is the point of entry for Optus close to the introduction of competition. Firm A is set as a new entrant in the long-distance market competing with an incumbent monopolist, providing minimum local service, but capturing 50 per cent of the toll market Sub0; 0:5. This con¢guration yields a subadditivity measure of 0.6517, showing that two ¢rms provide telecom- 
11 When the consistency region is not empty, it is within this region that a productivity measure such as the degree of subadditivity makes sense. With the test region being the consistency region or the domain of the estimated cost function, the ¢nding of natural monopoly locally is a necessary and su¤cient condition for global natural monopoly.
12 Note that (9) is the cost elasticity with respect to output. However, since the elasticity is de¢ned as the ratio of marginal to average costs, positive marginal costs require positive elasticities. 13 Firms are prevented from producing zero outputs where the translog cost function would not be de¢ned. munication services 65 per cent more e¤ciently than the government controlled monopoly. The hypothesis that the production of Australian local and toll services is a natural monopoly is rejected after 1945 since the cost of single ¢rm production is higher than the cost of two ¢rms producing the same level of services.
VIII Conclusions
Since 1991, the Australian telecommunications system has been privatized and competition introduced. The economic correctness of the procompetitive policy depends on the natural monopoly status of Australian telecommunications at the time policy was implemented. This paper provides the ¢rst publicly available estimates of the Australian telecommunications system cost structure. A test of the system's cost structure for natural monopoly characteristics is undertaken, with careful attention given to ensuring the subadditivity test is implemented over the proper region of the cost surface. Finally, we follow Evans and Heckman's (1988) dictum and ¢nd data of longer span, constructed from Australia Post, PMG and Telecom Australia annual reports for 1926^91.
The estimated cost function is statistically well speci¢ed, with all second-order output coe¤cients displaying plausible magnitudes. The subaddivity test is calculated for each year from 1943 through 1988. Additivity of the cost function after 1945 rejects the natural monopoly hypothesis and provides quali¢ed support for recent government policy that has progressively introduced more competition into Australian telecommunications markets. Diminishing natural monopoly characteristics also suggests that market co-ordination between separate ¢rms through networking is able to achieve similar economies as internal coordination with a monopoly. This ¢nding is important given the trend towards unbundling telecommunications network elements, and the provision of telecommunications services through interconnection.
Finally, RÎller (1990a RÎller ( , 1990b and Pulley and Braunstein (1992) suggest that tests for natural monopoly are sensitive to the functional form of the cost function. Future research will employ a composite cost function to examine subadditivity in Australian telephone services. The composite cost model is useful because it also permits the measurement of economies of scale, economies of scope and subadditivity, without prejudging their presence. Finally, as market data become available, a test for subadditivity will be implemented for output combinations dictated by actual Optus and Telstra market shares.
